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Abstract
Optimising policy choices to steer social/economic systems efficiently
towards desirable outcomes is challenging. The inter-dependent nature of
many elements of society and the economy means that policies designed to
promote one particular aspect often have secondary, unintended, effects.
In order to make rational decisions, methodologies and tools to assist
the development of intuition in this complex world are needed. One
approach is the use of agent-based models. These have the ability to
capture essential features and interactions and predict outcomes in a way
that is not readily achievable through either equations or words alone.
In this paper we illustrate how agent-based models can be used in
a policy setting by using an example drawn from the biowaste industry.
This example describes the growth of in-vessel composting and anaerobic
digestion to reduce food waste going to landfill in response to policies in
the form of taxes and financial incentives. The fundamentally dynamic
nature of an agent-based modelling approach is used to demonstrate that
1
policy outcomes depend not just on current policy levels but also on the
historical path taken.
keywords Agent-based modelling; biowaste policy; path-dependency; landfill
tax; renewable obligation certificates
1 Background
Designing effective policy to manage social systems is a difficult problem. Many
systems are complicated and nonlinear, which can result in indirect, unforeseen,
effects of a policy. The behaviour may be non-intuitive: the same policy ap-
plied in apparently similar scenarios may have different effects due to historical
factors. This is known as path dependency. These system issues can be further
exacerbated by the fact that different policy levers coming from different policy
perspectives are frequently aimed at steering the same system. For example, at
the UK government level, the Department structure lends itself to policy design
in silos, with each Department championing their own policies with their own
objectives and in competition with each other for financial resources from the
Treasury.
In this paper we illustrate how agent-based modelling can be used for sce-
nario planning and enable the user to investigate how policy decisions made at
a macro level impact on behaviour at the micro level, which in turn produces
emergent macro level outcomes. In contrast to other modelling approaches,
agent-based models (ABMs) are not expressed in terms of variables, functions
or equations [1, 2]. Instead the building blocks of an ABM are autonomous het-
erogeneous entities (so-called agents) that interact with each other and with
an artificial environment [3, 4]. For example, agents could be households,
consumers, companies, workers or even whole nations. Repeated interactions
among these agents over time induce ceaselessly changing microeconomic pat-
terns (e.g. production and consumption levels). The goal of ABMs is to properly
describe complex systems and to infer and analyse their aggregate properties—
in a bottom-up perspective —from the interactions and behaviours of micro
entities [2].
ABMs have been used in some policy areas, for example in economic policy
2
[5] but are still not widely used in others [6]. Here, we focus on the area of
policy for food waste disposal within the UK, but the key message that policy
outcomes can be path dependent and that dynamical modelling should be an
important part of the planning process, holds more generally.
The last two decades have seen a significant reduction in the percentage of
waste sent to landfill sites due to policy interventions, with more recycling of
paper, glass and metal and more biodegradable waste directed to either com-
posting or anaerobic digestion. The principal responsibility for waste policy
lies with Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), but
some aspects of environmental governance are also managed from the Depart-
ment for Energy and Climate Change (DECC), which was subsumed within the
new Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) in 2016.
Reducing the quantity of biodegradable waste sent to landfill and the concomi-
tant development of a market for renewable energy from biodegradable waste
requires the coordination of many agencies in both Departments [7], yet until
the joint publication of the Anaerobic Digestion Strategy and Action Plan in
2011 [8], there was little clear evidence of a joint strategy.
Waste policy developed due to concerns over the capacity of landfill sites in
the UK in 1990s [9] which led to the Department of the Environment strategy
document “Making Waste Work: A National Strategy for Waste” [10]. This was
a precursor of similar concerns in the European Community (EC) over capacity
and other possible negative effects of landfill on the environment, specifically
surface water, groundwater, soil, air and human health, which led to the Landfill
Directive [11]. This Directive set out requirements that member states reduce
the amount of biodegradable municipal waste going to landfill, with specific
targets for the UK set at 75% of the 1995 level by 2011, 50% by 2013 and 33%
by 2020.
In order to meet the objective of decreasing the amount of waste sent to
landfill, the UK introduced the 1996 UK Landfill Tax, heralded as the UK’s
first environmental tax. The tax is levied on landfill site operators and collected
by HM Customs and Revenue and is charged per tonne of waste. There are two
levels, one for inert waste and one for active waste, where biodegradable waste,
including food waste, is classified as active waste. Landfill site operators pass
the Landfill Tax on to waste producers as part of the so-called gate fee, which
is the charge that landfill site operators make for taking waste based, literally,
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on the number of tonnes of waste that come through the site gate. For active
waste, Landfill Tax was initially introduced at the low level of £7 per tonne,
but has been ramped up by successive governments to its current level in April
2018 of £88.95 per tonne, see Figure 1. The Landfill Tax provides an incentive
for waste producers to reduce the amount of waste that they send to landfill
and is used as a policy lever to enable the UK to meet its EU landfill targets.
Along with concerns over capacity, biodegradable waste regulation has also
been driven by growing concerns over climate change. Methane, a potent green-
house gas, is released during the decomposition of biodegradable waste in landfill
sites [12]. Methane emission from landfill sites and carbon emissions in the sup-
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Figure 1: UK Landfill Tax from 1995-2017.
ply chain resulted in the DEFRA Review of Waste Policy in England (2011)
identifying food waste as a priority [13]. This was followed up by the Anaerobic
Digestion Strategy and Action Plan (2011), under which anaerobic digestion
(AD) was promoted as an efficient use of biodegradable waste.
Hence, from a DEFRA perspective, the main focus has been on reducing
the amount of biodegradable waste sent to landfill, initially driven by concerns
over capacity and subsequently by concerns over greenhouse gas emission from
landfill sites. They have used, and continue to use, Landfill Tax as one of their
main policy instruments.
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At the same time, concern over climate change has changed energy policy.
Under the 2008 Climate Change Act [14] the UK aims to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions by at least 80% of the 1990 levels by 2050. Recognising that an
important element of greenhouse gas emissions comes from the reliance on fossil
fuels, the Renewable Obligation (RO) was introduced by the UK government in
2002 and reformed in 2009 [15]. The RO requires energy producers to provide
a particular share of their energy from renewable sources to their customers.
To support this, electricity generators receive Renewable Obligation Certifi-
cates (ROCs) for ‘green electricity’, that is electricity produced from renewable
sources. ROCs give electricity generators a price for green electricity that is
above the wholesale market price for electricity. ROCs are reviewed every four
years, with different technologies being allocated a different level of ROCs per
MWh of electricity generated [15] according to their technological and economic
development. As a consequence, ROCs received for individual renewable energy
technologies can change stepwise over time.
The decomposition of biodegradable waste in AD plants produces methane
that can either be sold directly as a renewable fuel or burned on-site to generate
green electricity. Either way, an important income stream for AD plants comes
from ROCs. The net effect is that the waste policy of promoting the use of
AD plants is intimately connected with the energy policy of using ROCs, with
ROCs having a direct impact on the financial viability of AD plants.
Using an agent-based model we consider a number of different scenarios to
examine the impact of Landfill Tax and the RO policy. This highlights how the
impact of policies on the development of an AD industry is path dependent,
that is, how the outcome of a policy is dependent both on the nature of the
policy and the length of time that a policy is in place. In Section 2 we give a
short introduction to the agent-based model and the software used to create,
run and analyse model output. This is followed by key results and discussion
in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.
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2 The agent-based model and the computa-
tional approach
2.1 The agent-based model
The specific model considered here illustrates the possible impact of Landfill
Tax and ROCs on the recycling of food waste. In the model, the agents consist
of individual companies that either produce food waste or take food waste in as
a raw material and process it; this latter category of agents includes in-vessel
composters and AD plants which currently represent the prime methods used
for recycling food waste. In-vessel composting refers to a collection of methods
where organic waste is recycled in a container or building in which air circu-
lation, temperature and moisture are controlled to ensure that decomposition
occurs aerobically. Conversely, in AD plants decomposition is designed to occur
without access to oxygen, resulting in the production of methane. AD plants
are more expensive to both build and run than in-vessel composters.
Most of the simulations shown below start with no waste processing agents
and with all organic waste going to landfill. Waste processing agents start up if
it is ‘profitable’ for them to do so, and go out of business if they go bankrupt.
Each day, each agent runs through a sequence of steps that mimics the day-to-
day decision processes of the companies concerned. For example, producers of
food waste generate waste and send their waste to composters, AD plants or to
landfill, whereas, waste processing companies take in food waste, process it and
sell the products, debts are paid and money received for sale of the outputs.
Each agent develops its own trading network: waste processing agents start
by only having a few business ‘contacts’ and gradually extend their list of con-
tacts with time. This knowledge network is important: an agent can only do
business with someone that they know.
The overall daily list of decisions for the agents is set out in Table 1. Each
of these decisions have to be modelled. So for example, specific rules have to
be defined for how waste processing companies decide to start up; who trades
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1. Agents that produce food waste buy raw materials.
2. The raw materials are processed, generating food waste.
3. Existing contracts to supply food waste are fulfilled.
4. New contracts are made and food waste transferred under the terms of
these contracts from suppliers to waste processors.
5. Prices of food waste are updated by the suppliers of food waste.
6. Any food waste that has not gone to food waste processors goes to landfill.
7. Waste processors buy any additional materials that they need to process
the waste that they have.
8. Waste is processed by the waste processors.
9. Waste processors sell their outputs.
10. Waste processors pay for operating costs and for loans.
11. The profit for each agent is calculated.
12. Any agents who have run out of money go bust.
13. New ‘contacts’ are made.
14. New waste processing companies are formed if it is ‘profitable’ for them
to do so.
15. Any contracts that have come to the end of their contract period expire.
Table 1: List of daily tasks in the agent-based model.
with whom; how waste is priced and how different policies are implemented.
Full details of the model, model parameter choices and how these decisions are
implemented are given in the Supplementary Material.
2.2 The computational method and agent-based software
During the model development phase, the model was coded in an open source
agent-based modelling package called Netlogo [16] (version 5.0.5). The Netlogo
environment has the advantage that it is easy to construct interactive models,
where the user can vary parameters using buttons or sliders and consequent
model behaviour can be observed, in real time, in a variety of graphical forms.
Subsequently, for speed of computation and ease of analysis of the simulation
data, the model was re-coded in MATLAB [17]. Both the Netlogo code and the
MATLAB code are available from the Surrey Data repository.
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3 Results
In section 3.1, we discuss two general scenarios (i) the impact of ramping up the
Landfill Tax in the absence of ROCs; (ii) the impact of ramping the Landfill Tax
with different levels of ROCs. The results demonstrate how different policies
differentially affect AD plants and in-vessel composters and how existing policy
has favoured the development of AD plants at the cost of in-vessel composting.
This viewpoint is supported by data showing the number of AD plants versus
in-vessel composters for the period 2009-2016.
Looking ahead, there are various policy options open to DEFRA and BEIS
for incentivising the bio-waste industry. In section 3.2, we demonstrate that,
even with only two policies, the outcome can depend on how the policies are
applied: the same levels of Landfill Tax and ROCs can result in radically dif-
ferent proportions of AD plants to in-vessel composters depending on the order
and the time for which the policies are implemented.
3.1 Changing Landfill Tax and ROCs
Before considering how a changing policy landscape alters policy outcome, the
basic behaviour of the model is shown. In Figure 2, the result of a typical
simulation with the landfill gate fee fixed at £20 (£20 is the typical landfill
operating cost excluding Landfill Tax) and no ROCs is shown. Over time, as
seen in (a), the amount of food waste going to landfill reduces, in parallel the
number of companies that take in food waste grows and the price goes up (see
(b)). However, there are a number of important points to note.
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Figure 2: Typical model behaviour with a gate fee of £20 (no Landfill Tax)
and no ROCs. (a) Shows how the amount of waste going to landfill (black),
on average, decreases with time settling to an approximately constant level.
The reduction in waste going to landfill is mirrored by an increase in waste
that is recycled (orange). (b) The corresponding changes in the number of
composters (black) and in the price of waste (blue). No AD plants (red) are set
up because the conditions are not favourable for their establishment. The ‘price’
is negative, indicating that waste producers have to pay to have their organic
waste removed. In all cases, the lines shown are the average for 10 simulations.
The grey band indicates the mean plus/minus one standard deviation.
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Firstly, over time, the amount of food waste going to landfill settles down to
an approximately constant, non-zero, value. This is a direct result of the market-
driven price dynamics within the model: companies producing food waste set
higher prices if they are able to sell all their food waste to waste processing
companies, and decrease their prices if they have to send some of it to landfill.
Implicit within this decision rule is that companies only adjust their prices
through what they learn about the market through their interactions; there is
no global price information. The average price across all companies reaches
an approximate equilibrium, with some companies increasing their prices and
some decreasing their prices, at the point when the average increase in price
is equal to the average decrease in price. For a total of N companies, if p of
them recycle their waste and increase their price by u, then there are (N − p)
companies who send some waste to landfill and decrease their prices by d. An
estimate for the equilibrium level is pu = (N−p)d, which gives that the fraction
of food waste producers that recycle their waste is approximately p
N
= d
u+d
. For
the simulation shown in Figure 2, u = 0.05, d = 0.1, leading to approximately
two-thirds of waste being diverted from landfill. We note that the power of the
agent-based modelling approach is its ability to investigate the non-equilibrium
situation: in a setting such as that considered here, where there is no global
price information and the timescales for market change are relatively long, it
is questionable whether equilibrium is reached before either a policy change or
technical advance occurs.
Secondly, as more waste processing companies enter the marketplace there
is competition for waste, so the average price increases from the initial value
of −£20 that is fixed by the gate fee. (Note that we have defined the ‘price’
to be the amount of money received by the waste producer for organic waste
in pounds per tonne. Hence a negative price means that waste producers have
to pay for the removal of their organic waste, rather than being able to sell
it.) Prices do not increase indefinitely. Waste processing companies start out
with an initial investment of capital and at each time step spend money on raw
materials, operating costs and loan repayment. At the same time they receive
an income from the sale of their products. Although the initial investment
enables companies to operate for the short term even if they make a loss, they
cannot keep making a loss without running out of money and consequently
going out of business. Within the ABM simulations, the result is that prices
settle about an equilibrium value where on average companies just make a
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profit. For composters, with the parameters fixed as given in Table S1 in the
Supplementary Material, this means that the maximum sustainable ‘price’ for
organic waste is approximately −£12.
Thirdly, there is initially an approximately linear increase in the number
of composters. In the model, we set how frequently new companies consider
whether to start up or not. Here set to one per fortnight, companies only set
up if it is economically attractive to do so. Since initially the price is low,
companies set up at a constant rate of one per fortnight, resulting in the linear
increase in the number of companies.
Finally, there are large oscillations in the price, which then lead to large
oscillations in the number of waste processing companies and consequently in the
amount of waste going to landfill. The presence of oscillations is because there is
inherently some delay in the system: when waste is very low in price, companies
make a profit. This accrued wealth then sustains them through a period when
prices are unrealistically high. Eventually, continued high prices result in some
companies consistently making a loss and going out of business. Since many of
the companies started at a similar time with a similar economic model, once
one goes out of business many others follow. Essentially, the accrued wealth
through the ‘good’ times enable companies to function for a certain period
in an environment which is not economically sustainable. The buffer of the
accrued wealth means that there is a delay between economically unsustainable
conditions and the companies going out of business.
3.1.1 Increasing Landfill Tax
The typical effect of increasing Landfill Tax according to the historical time
course (Figure 1), thereby increasing the cost of sending organic waste to landfill,
is shown in Figure 3(a) and (b). At the start of the simulation, all organic waste
goes to landfill. When the Landfill Tax is introduced and combined with the gate
fee, it costs £27 /tonne for waste producers to send organic waste to landfill i.e.
a ‘price’ of −£27 for organic waste. After three years, Landfill Tax is increased
to £10, further increasing the cost of sending waste to landfill. This only leads
to a small dip in the price of organic waste since, by this point, much of the
waste is being recycled. As more and more organic waste is recycled, the price of
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organic waste becomes less and less sensitive to the Landfill Tax. Hence overall,
the picture with gradually increasing Landfill Tax is qualitatively similar to that
shown for no Landfill Tax in Figure 2. In the long term, the amount of waste
going to landfill and the price for food waste are unchanged. This is because
altering the Landfill Tax has only an indirect impact on the internal economics
of the individual composters as it is a tax paid by the landfill operators. There
is the same initial linear increase in the number of companies that is seen in the
absence of Landfill Tax, but since the price remains attractive for longer, more
companies start up.
There is an interesting side effect of the policy: as with no Landfill Tax, there
are oscillations in the price that lead to oscillations in the number of composters
and the amount of waste recycled. The Landfill Tax tends to exacerbate these
oscillations, making their amplitude larger. This is because the Landfill Tax
has a significant influence on the price for organic waste for the first few years.
This is the period when most organic waste is still sent to landfill and there
is little competition between waste processing companies. During this period,
the price for organic waste is lower in the presence of Landfill Tax than in its
absence. A lower price enables waste processing companies to make a higher
profit. However, this higher profit means that they have more financial reserves,
allowing them to remain in the market for longer when prices start to rise and
resulting in prices reaching a greater maximum before crashing.
3.1.2 Increasing ROCs
The principle behind increasing Landfill Tax is that high gate fees will promote a
market in biowaste around an equilibrium price. AD plants are more expensive
to start up and more expensive to run than in-vessel composting. For this
reason, our simulations of the effect of changing Landfill Tax did not lead to the
development of an AD industry: competition between in-vessel composters kept
the price that waste processors have to pay for waste above the level that makes
AD plants economically viable. This position is changed with the introduction
of ROCs, as is shown in Figure 3(c) and (d). In our simulations, ROCs at a
fixed level equivalent to 8p/kWh are introduced after six years, to mimic the
introduction of ROCs in 2002, six years after the introduction of the Landfill
Tax.
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Figure 3: Typical model behaviour with Landfill Tax increased as shown in Fig-
ure 1, where time zero corresponds to the time of the introduction of Landfill
Tax in 1996. (a) and (b) in the absence of ROCs; (c) and (d) ROCs initially
set at zero but increased to the fixed level of eight pence/kWh of electricity
after six years. The lines show: the amount of organic waste going to landfill
(black); the amount of organic waste recycled (orange); the number of com-
posters (black); the number of AD plants (red) and the price (blue). In all
cases, the lines shown are the average for ten simulations. The grey band indi-
cates the mean plus/minus one standard deviation to give an indication of the
degree of variability between simulations.
Again, as waste processing businesses enter the marketplace, competition
for waste drives the price up. The price reaches a high, unsustainable max-
imum before dropping and oscillating about an approximately constant level.
During the first seven years, when there is ample waste and no ROCs incentive,
composters start up. With the introduction of ROCs, AD plants also start to
appear. However, once the price that waste processors have to pay for waste
becomes unsustainably high because of the competition for waste, it is the com-
panies who are ‘fittest’ that survive. Here, the fitness of the company depends
crucially on the internal company finances with companies that are more prof-
itable having more chance of survival. In the simulation shown in Figure 3(c)
and (d), the ROCs enable the AD plants to win out.
13
The greater the financial incentive for anaerobic digestion, the more they
dominate the marketplace, see Figure 4. This figure shows the results of four
scenarios: in each case the Landfill Tax is ramped as shown in Figure 1 and
ROCs are introduced after six years but at different levels (4,6,8, and 10p/KWh
respectively). In panel (a), where ROCs are 4p/KWh, the ROCs level is too
low for AD plants to start up, unlike in (b)-(d). The higher the ROCs level,
the faster the development of the AD industry and the more quickly in-vessel
composting collapses.
Figure 4: The impact of different levels of ROCs incentives. (a)-(d) show the
dynamics in price (blue line), number of composters (black line) and AD plants
(red line) for different levels of ROCs incentive. A ROCs level of x means that
x pence/kWh is paid for the electricity from year six onwards. A low level of
ROCs, as in (a), means that it is not financially attractive for AD plants. Once
ROCs levels are above a threshold to promote the growth of AD plants, the
main impact of increasing ROCs is to push up the price of food waste.
Note that, once financial incentives are high enough that it becomes eco-
nomically viable to run an AD plant, the overall level of the ROCs does little
to directly benefit the waste industry: competition means that greater financial
incentives result in higher prices for waste. So the main beneficiaries of financial
incentives become the waste producers, not the waste processors. Consequently,
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Figure 5: The number of AD plants and in-vessel composters in the UK for the
period 2009-2016. Figure courtesy of Andrew Gadd, Link2Energy.
higher financial incentives do not result in more AD plants or in more waste be-
ing recycled and instead turns waste into a marketable by-product. This could
be regarded as reducing the incentive to minimise waste generation, which runs
counter to the fundamental principles of waste management.
To summarise, we can recognise that the drive to increase food waste recy-
cling becomes a competition for the survival of the fittest between anaerobic
digestion and in-vessel composting, where the ‘fittest’ is the type of business that
is most economically profitable. This competitive scenario appears to be borne
out by data on the number of AD plants and the number of in-vessel composters
in the UK over the period 2009-2016, as shown in Figure 5. This suggests that
AD plants are currently out-competing in-vessel composting. However, since
the financial viability of anaerobic digestion is strongly tied to financial incen-
tives determined by policy, this is not a robust situation. In the next section,
we demonstrate that a phased removal/reduction of ROCs can lead to different
scenarios.
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3.2 Path dependency
Figure 4 suggests that the relative composition of composters to anaerobic di-
gesters depends on the financial incentives. However, the situation is more
complex: the historical state of the market has a strong influence on policy
outcome. This is illustrated in Figure 6(a) and (b). This shows the results
of a series of simulations where the ROCs level is increased in increments of
1p/kWh from zero up to 10p/KWh and then reduced again. For each value of
the ROCs, the simulations are run for 50 years so that transient behaviour has
died away. This enables the underlying equilibrium structure to be determined.
The timescales involved may mean that an equilibrium is never reached, but an
understanding of the equilibrium structure is nevertheless useful: as we will see
below, it is this equilibrium structure that underpins transient behaviour. So for
the results shown in Figure 6(a) and (b) the sequence is: start at a ROCs level
of zero, run the simulation for 50 years and record the outcome. Then increase
the ROCs by 1p/kWh, and starting from the final state of the previous simula-
tion, compute for a further 50 years and record the outcome. This is continued
until the ROCs level is 10p/kWh. Then the process is repeated, but this time
stepping down in ROCs. This whole process of increasing then decreasing the
ROCs was repeated ten times. Figure (a) and (b) show the mean values, with
error bars indicating the standard deviation across the ten different realisation.
The filled/open circles correspond to values obtained for increasing/decreasing
ROCs. The mean values are connected with a line to guide the eye.
In Figure 6 it can be seen that if the ROCs incentives are increased gradually
from zero, no AD plants occur (cf Figure 4 (a)) until the ROCs level is above
5p/kWh; no composters occur if the ROCs levels are maintained above 7p/kWh
(cf Figure 4(c) and (d)). However, if the ROCs are first raised to a high level
then reduced, a mixture of AD plants and composters can exist, even for ROCs
levels below 5p/kWh. So for the same ROCs incentive (0 to 6p/kWh) the
balance between the AD plants and composters is strongly dependent on the
policy history. The reason for the existence of two possible outcomes for the
same ROCs incentive is that the financial decision to start an AD plant is
based on whether it is ‘profitable’ to do so. The decision on profitability is
based on the current market price for organic waste, the cost of any other raw
materials, the cost of any loans and the day-to-day running of the plant and
the income from selling electricity, all assuming the plant is operating at 80%
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capacity. The conditions for company start-up are more stringent than those
for an established AD plant to survive, since the established plants may be able
to operate at greater than 80% capacity and/or have paid off their loans. So on
gradually increasing the ROCs, no AD plants start up until the ROCs level is
above approximately 5p/kWh. However, on decreasing the ROCs, it is possible
for some AD plants to survive at ROCs levels below 5p/kWh. No account of
future market price/policy expectations are made in the decision to start up,
but including market expectations is unlikely to change the fact that the market
conditions required for a company to start-up are unlikely to be the same as
the market conditions required for a mature company to survive.
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Figure 6: Path dependency: (a) and (b) show the steady-state number of AD
plants and composters as ROCs are gradually increased from 0 to 10p/kWh
in steps of 1p/kWh, allowing sufficient time at each new ROCs value for tran-
sient behaviour to die away. The mean of ten different simulations is shown
by the filled/open circles, corresponding to increasing/decreasing ROCs respec-
tively. The error bars indicate the standard deviation across the ten different
realisation.
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If the desired policy outcome is to have a sustainable AD industry but with
minimal financial incentive, this suggests that this is possible, but only if there
is sufficient investment for a long enough initial period to firmly establish the
AD industry. This is further illustrated in Figure 7(a) and (b) where ROCs are
introduced at a high level, then reduced after 10 or 30 years respectively. In
each case, it appears that a thriving AD industry has been established between
year 7 and year 17 when the higher level of incentives is in place. However,
with the removal of the incentives in year 17 (Figure 7(a)), the AD industry
collapses because they are no longer financially viable. The crash in the AD
industry results in a crash in prices with more waste initially diverted to landfill,
before the in-vessel composting industry fills the vacuum. The difference after
30 years is that at least some of the AD plants have existed for long enough to
pay off their set-up costs and/or are managing to operate at greater than 80%
capacity — in the simulations it is assumed that loans to cover set-up costs are
repaid over a twenty year period.
The wider implication is that a fixed low level of financial incentive may
not be enough to kick-start the development of a given industry: the financial
incentive needs to be high enough for investors to see a viable business plan, and
in place long enough that businesses are firmly established and able to compete
with other industries that use the same resources.
4 Discussion
Policy design is challenging: almost inevitably policies that are designed to have
one primary effect have secondary, perhaps unintended, consequences. Here,
our purpose is to illustrate the benefits of using an ABM as a thinking/scenario
planning tool to aid the development of intuition [18]. Specifically, we consider
how the interaction between in-vessel composting, a low-cost technology (that
still demands considerable process control for quality output), and anaerobic
digestion, could result in a market for organic waste.
The model shows that, as is to be expected in a market driven system, when
resources are abundant prices are low. As they become scarcer, prices increase
and reach a dynamic equilibrium value that is based on the need for compa-
nies to make a profit to survive and, consequently, on the financial incentives
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Figure 7: Path dependency: the effect of increasing ROCs after year 6 to 10
p/kWh for a period of (a) 10 and (b) 30 years respectively, before reducing
them to two pence/kWh. The mean number of composters (black) and number
of AD plants (red) for ten different simulations. The grey band indicates the
mean +/− one standard deviation to give some idea of the variability across
simulations. The ROCs level is shown in blue, with the blue arrows indicating
the points where the ROCs levels are changed.
available in the system. However, the power of an ABM approach is both the
ability to encode decisions at the microscale from which macroscopic patterns
of behaviour emerge, and the ability to study the non-equilibrium situation.
So, from the microscale of individual waste contracts between waste producers
and waste processors emerges a pattern that suggests organic waste recycling
could be viewed as a battle for the ‘survival of the fittest’ with AD plants and
in-vessel composters competing for a finite resource (organic waste). Policies
that give financial incentives can change the ‘fitness’ of different ‘species’ of
company, with large financial incentives for some companies resulting in their
market dominance. The need to study the non-equilibrium system is empha-
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sised by the decade long timescales required to reach equilibrium, when policy
change typically occurs on the timescale of years.
Our results suggest that there are at least three possible indirect effects
of the ROCs policy on the organic waste industry: firstly, by promoting AD
plants as a means to recycle organic waste it could drive in-vessel composters
out of business. Secondly, above a threshold level that is needed to make AD
plants viable, increasing ROCs does little to promote AD and instead drives
the price of organic waste up, effectively subsidising waste producers. The fact
that financial incentives do not necessarily benefit those that they are aimed at
is seen in other areas of policy, where, for example, financial incentives to help
people buy houses can drive house prices up, not make houses more affordable.
Thirdly, high levels of ROCs could result in the price of organic waste becoming
positive, meaning that waste producers can sell their waste instead of having to
pay for it to be removed. This potentially incentivises waste production rather
than waste minimization. Hence the BEIS policy of ROCs could inadvertently
undermine DEFRA’s drive to reduce organic waste. This is a direct result
of the differential impact of the ROCs policy on composters and AD plants
because of the dual role that AD plants have as both waste treatment and
energy production plants.
It appears that the Landfill Tax provides a useful driver to encourage waste
processing companies to enter the marketplace, but once there is competition
for waste, further increases in Landfill Tax may have little effect.
The discipline of developing an ABM can itself help clarify relationships and
identify dominant factors/interactions that determine behaviour. Furthermore,
although it may be difficult to find parameters to calibrate the model precisely,
the modelling approach means that model outcomes can be tested as to their
sensitivity to model assumptions. Like micro-economic simulations, our ABM
simulation and analysis focuses on prices and tonnage and subsequent dynamics,
although it could readily be extended to include other effects.
Finally, our results illustrate that different policy trajectories can lead to
different business outcomes, as seen by our results on path dependency. Both
the simulations shown in Figure 7 started with the same initial market state
with all waste going to landfill and price dictated by the Landfill Tax. In both
cases the ROCs level was introduced after six years at the level of 10p/kWh
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and at the end of the simulation was at the level of 2p/kWh. In both cases a
thriving AD industry appeared to have been established, but in one case the
AD industry crashed, and in the other it did not. The difference between the
simulations was the policy path: in one case ROCs were reduced after 30 years,
and in the other after only 10 years. This illustrates the risks of stopping a
costly policy when it appears to have ‘worked’. This path dependency is typical
of systems which are nonlinear, but is perhaps alarming from a policy design
perspective: it confirms the fact that policies need to be well-designed to avoid
lock-in to inferior outcomes.
Our results further highlight the fact that a static view of policy, with a
given policy linked to a given outcome is insufficient to predict policy effect
reinforces and the need for dynamic techniques such as agent-based modelling.
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1 Model details
At each time step the agents in the model undertake a series of tasks, as
listed in Table 1.
Within the model, the main role of waste producers is to produce waste
which they then transfer either to landfill or to waste processing companies.
The role of waste processors is more complicated and we give further details
on how they function in 1.1. In 1.2, the values used for model parameters
are discussed. There are a number of key decision rules: how waste
processing companies decide to start-up; who trades with whom; the
pricing of waste, and how different policies are implemented. These are
discussed in sections 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, respectively.
1
1.1 Waste processing
The material processing is modelled as an input-output process where each
waste processing company takes inputs of up to four different types and
produces up to four different types of output, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Mout
Sout
Gout
Wout
Min
Sin
Gin
Win
Figure 1: Process diagram for companies
Currently, these four different inputs/outputs represent: general material,
Mi; food waste, Si; carbon dioxide, Gi and other waste, Wi, where the
subscripts i = in and i = out are self-explanatory. The mapping between
the inputs and the outputs is represented by a four by four ‘process’
matrix, P so 

Mout
Sout
Gout
Wout

 = P


Min
Sin
Gin
Win

 . (1)
This general structure is flexible in that the inputs/outputs could be
re-labelled to represent different categories, as long as an appropriate
process matrix P can be constructed. In the two particular cases considered
here, P takes a particularly simple structure, but the model is designed to
be readily extendable to more complex processes.
Composters take in food waste (Sin), and produce compost (Mout), and
CO2 (Gout). Based on [1], these are taken to be related by Mout = 0.55Sin
2
and Gout = 0.324Sin and the process matrix therefore takes the form
P =


0 0.55 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0.324 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

 .
AD plants take in food waste and produces digestate and biogas consisting
mainly of methane and carbon dioxide. It is assumed that the biogas is
then used to generate electricity. So the AD plant takes in food waste (Sin)
and produces Mout consisting of digestate, electricity and CO2 (Gout). CO2
is related to input waste by Gout = 0.74Sin.
To reflect that Mout represents a mixture of digestate and electricity in the
process matrix we have set that each tonne of food in produces one “unit”
of Mout, where one unit of Mout corresponds to 0.55 tonnes of digestate and
0.96kWh. This fact that Mout consists of two different types of output is
then taken care of in the pricing of Mout, discussed further below.
P =


0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0.74 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

 .
1.1.1 Finances of waste processors
At each time step, waste processors receive/pay money for their inputs,
receive money for their outputs and pay operating costs. They may also
have to make payments associated with loans. Since it can be expensive to
set up a waste processing plant, particularly in the case of AD plants we
assume that in order to start-up, waste processors have to take out a loan.
Suppose that the price/tonne for each input/output is given by £Pi where
i = {Min, Sin, Gin,Win,Mout, Sout, Gout,Wout}; that the size of a given
company is Z tonnes/day and they operate at a fraction α of their capacity,
where α ∈ [0, 1]. Set-up costs are typically assumed to scale in according to
a power law with size, we therefore suppose and is given by £L (Z/Zref )
0.6,
where Zref is the size of a reference plant and L is the cost of setting up a
plant of size Zref [2].
We assume that the loan is to be paid off at an annual interest rate of
100r% over a period of n years. Suppose that their daily operating costs
are proportional to size and given by £OcZ. Then the profit, £F , for each
day is given by
F = αZ [(PMoutMout + PSoutSout + PGoutGout + PWoutWout)
3
− (PMinMin + PSinSin + PGinGin + PWinWin)]
−OcZ −
1
365


rL
(
Z
Zref
)0.6
1− (1 + r)−n

 . (2)
Note that the prices Pi can be positive or negative.
Current legislation does not charge for greenhouse gas emissions from
composting or from AD, and so at present, PGout = 0.
Using the appropriate values from the processing matrix P, for composters,
equation (2) reduces to
FC = αZ [0.55PMout − PSin ]−OcZ −
1
365


rL
(
Z
Zref
)0.6
1− (1 + r)−n

 , (3)
and for AD plants equation (2) reduces to
FAD = αZ [PMout − PSin ]−OcZ −
1
365


rL
(
Z
Zref
)0.6
1− (1 + r)−n

 . (4)
1.2 Parameters
An important element of any modelling endeavour, and agent-based
modelling is no exception, is in choosing appropriate magnitudes for the
many parameters.
1.2.1 Company sizes
UK food waste amounts to approximately 15 million tonnes a year, of
which approximately 7.2 million is from households and 3.9 million from
manufacturing from around 7000 food and drink companies. In 2009, there
were 600,000 tonnes of food waste from the hospitality sector, most of
which went to landfill.
For the simulations here, we consider only the largest 700 companies that
together have a total waste output of approximately 2 million tonnes per
annum. The average waste per day per company is 7.8 tonnes, with
companies varying from 1 to 14.6 tonnes a day.
Anaerobic digesters can operate on a small scale, with some viable plants
operating on farms primarily fed with slurry. Here we focus on the role of
large commercial plants for food waste that can process about 50,000
tonnes of food waste/annum, equating to approximately 150 tonnes/day.
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In-vessel composters range from 10,000 tonnes/annum to 75,000
tonnes/annum, that is from 30 to 200 tonnes/day. In the model, the size of
composters is set randomly between 30 and 200 tonnes/day.
1.2.2 Parameters for loans
It has been assumed that all loans have an interest rate of 5% and last for
20 years.
1.2.3 Parameters for AD plants
For AD plants, it is assumed that each tonne of waste, input results in Mout
consisting of 0.55 tonnes of digestate and 960kWh of electricity. with a
price given by
PMout = 960× Price/kWh of electricity + 0.55× price/tonne of digestate.
There is little market for digestate, so for the current simulations the price
for digestate is set at £0/tonne.
Operating costs are set to be £20/tonne capacity each day this is based on
the fact that a typical AD plant employs approximately 0.05 people per
tonne each day.
In a report by Andersons on the economic viability of AD [3], it is
estimated that to build an AD plant costs between £2,500 and £6,000 for
every kW of electricity of generating capacity, averaging about £4,000.
Since we assume a fixed size of AD plant with a generating capacity of
6MW, we therefore choose Z = Zref and L = £24 million.
1.2.4 Parameters for composters
The financial investment required to start composting is substantially lower
than for AD and we have taken the cost for a reference plant that can take
1 tonne of waste a day as L = £5000. The operating costs are also lower
and have been taken as Oc = £10/tonne of capacity. Like digestate, there is
currently little market for compost from in-vessel composting, so the price
for compost is set at £0/tonne.
1.3 Waste processing company start-up
In most of the simulations presented in this paper we assume that initially
there are no waste processing companies and that all food waste goes to
landfill, reflecting the position in the early 1990s when very little food
5
Agent Parameter meaning Parameter label Value
Waste producers Size 1− 14.6 tonnes/day
Anaerobic digester Size Z 150 tonnes/day
Price of food waste PSin ∗
Price of product PMout (digestate) £0/tonne
PMout (electricity) £0.00− 0.14/kWh
†
Size of initial loan L (Z/Zref ) £24,000,000
Interest rate r 0.05 (5%)
Length of loan n 20 years
Operating costs OcZ £20 Z
Composter Size Z 30− 200 tonnes/day
Price of food waste PSin ∗
Price of product PMout £0
Size of initial loan L (Z/Zref )
0.6
£5,000-120,000
Cost of reference plant L £5000
Size of reference plant Zref 1 tonnes/day
Interest rate r 0.05 (5%)
Length of loan n 20 years
Operating costs OcZ £10 Z
Table S1: ∗ These are updated as the model runs. † This value depends on
the ROCs.
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waste was recycled. At any given point in time, waste companies start up
depending on whether (i) there is sufficient food waste going to landfill (ii)
it is financially attractive to do so. Financial attractiveness is determined
by using current market conditions in the model to estimate whether or not
a composting/AD business will be profitable within five years, taking into
account set-up costs, operating costs and predicted operating capacity.
Composting requires relatively little investment to set up, is cheap to run
and hence has little associated financial risk. In contrast, AD plants are
expensive to set up and more labour intensive to run. This disparity in
business types means that the financial conditions for the start up of AD
plants are more stringent than for composters.
1.4 Who trades with whom?
Waste producing and waste processing agents interact with each other
through two networks of links, one representing who knows who, ‘contacts’,
and one representing the transfer of food waste from producer to processor
as part of a waste ‘contract’. These two networks are dynamic: new
companies start with few contacts and, over time, gradually make contacts
with other companies. This knowledge network is important because a
necessary pre-condition for establishing a contract between companies is
that companies know about each other. At an extreme, a lack of
connectedness results in companies establishing an insufficient volume of
contracts and business failure.
The choice of contract partner is based on who is in the waste processors
contact network and who has waste to dispose of. If there is more than one
possible waste supplier, then a contract is formed with the supplier of waste
who is offering food waste at the lowest price. Since arranging contracts
takes time, each day a fixed maximum number of contracts can be formed
by any one processor.
Each waste processing company has a maximum possible operating
capacity. Contracts are formed for a variable amount of time, dependent on
whether the contract is with an AD plant or a composter. This reflects
differences between the different business types: composters have
considerable flexibility about when and how much waste they can take in
and tend to operate on a daily basis. In contrast, AD plants have a less
flexible operation, and will tend to have a mixture of short and some longer
contracts. Consequently, in the ABM all contracts for composters are set to
be fourteen days long. Each contract with and AD plant has a different
length, chosen randomly from two weeks to six months.
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1.5 Cost of waste
In order to send waste to landfill, food waste producers have to pay landfill
operators a fee that is dependent on the weight of food waste passing
through the gate of the landfill site, the ‘gate fee’. It is assumed that food
waste producers will preferentially send their food waste to any company
that will charge them less—or even pay them—for their waste.
Consequently, initially, when there are no food waste processors and all
waste goes to landfill, the ‘price’ of waste is negative and is specified
relative to the Landfill Tax, with an assumption that the gate fee for landfill
sites is £20 more per tonne than the Landfill Tax: this is representative of
gate fees for the period 2008-2014, as reported in [4] from data in [5].
Over time, as companies that process waste enter the market place,
competition for food waste drives the average price up. This increase in
waste food price happens at the agent level: it is assumed that food waste
producers will increase the price of waste if they can send all of it to food
waste processors, and decrease it if they have to send some waste to landfill,
with the minimum price level being the gate fee.
1.6 Policy implementation
Two specific policy categories were discussed in Section 3, namely Landfill
Tax and financial incentives for AD plants in the form of ROCs.
1.6.1 Landfill Tax
Landfill Tax is paid by landfill site operators to HM Customs and Revenue
on the waste they collect. Landfill site operators pass on any change in
Landfill Tax to their customers, so there is a direct correspondence between
increases in Landfill Tax and increases in gate fee. Consequently, changes in
Landfill Tax are modelled as changes in the cost of sending food waste to
landfill sites.
1.6.2 ROCs
AD plants benefit from the RO policy through the biogas that they
produce. This benefit is either in the form of a guaranteed payment based
on the price per MWh of green electricity generated or from the market
price of biogas. In the model, for simplicity, we assume that all AD plants
use the biogas that they produce to generate electricity and receive a price
for the electricity that is directly dependent on the ROCs they receive.
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